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Abstract
There is more to strategic voting than simply avoiding to waste someone’s vote if
one is liberated from the corset of studying voting behavior in plurality systems.
Mixed electoral systems provide different voters with various incentives to cast a
strategic vote. They do not only determine the degree of strategic voting, but also the
kind of strategies voters employ. Strategic voters employ either a wasted-vote or a
coalition insurance strategy but cast their vote not automatically for large parties as
the current literature suggest. This has important implication for the consolidation of
party systems. Moreover, even when facing the same institutional incentives, voters
vary in their proclivity to vote strategically.
What is the influence of electoral rules on the way people make decisions in the
voting booth? This work attempts to refocus the discussion of the impact of electoral
institutions on voting behavior from its narrow focus on single-member plurality systems.
The literature on strategic voting agrees that institutional incentives are the driving force
that spurs strategic voting. That said, it is somewhat surprising that this literature has not
looked more closely at variations in the main independent variable and studied the effect of
a variety of the institutional settings on the extent and nature of the strategic voting
phenomenon. Similar to a natural experiment, the focus on two-ballot mixed electoral
systems offers the opportunity to study influences of electoral rules by holding individual
factors constant: The same voter, after all, cast two separate votes, a candidate vote and a
list vote, under different rules.
We know that naively applying behavioral theories without reference to the
institutional embeddedness of the act of voting is misconceived. Some voters systematically
deviate from their most preferred candidate or party in the voting booth, contrary to what
traditional vote choice theories would predict, and cast their vote for a less preferred one.
Theories of strategic voting offer an opportunity to extend traditional vote choice
predictions in order to model the act of voting more realistically. Unfortunately, there is no
sufficiently developed micro logic to predict under what conditions and under what
particular institutional setting we would expect someone to deviate from her most
preferred candidate or party. Moreover, such theories are all the more warranted to provide
solid microfoundations for important macro-level relationships between electoral systems
and party systems, that help us to understand the institutional forces that are at work
during the development and change of party systems. This is particularly relevant for the
consolidation of new democracies.
Recent adoptions of mixed electoral systems, particularly among the new
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post-communist democracies, have stimulated scholarly interest in these kind of electoral
institutions (Ferrara and Herron 2005). The particular design of mixed electoral systems
vary considerably and, consequently, so does the influence of Duverger’s (1954)
“mechanical” process, and potentially the extent of his hypothesized “psychological”
process, that motivate voters to cast a strategic vote. The kind of strategies employed,
however, pertains to the ballot structure of mixed systems and is therefore comparable
across a wide range of mixed electoral systems. Thus being aware of the kind of strategies
voters might employ in such systems and their consequences for the party system has
broad implications for the transformation- and consolidation-process of newly established
democracies.
Expectation Formation and the Proclivity of Strategic Voting
Mixed electoral systems are an especially interesting testing ground for studying the
influence of electoral institutions on voting behavior. Voters are inclined to employ
multiple strategies because of the combination of plurality and proportional voting rules. A
sincere voter is someone who votes for her most preferred party (or party candidate).
Conversely, a strategic voter is someone who votes for another party (or party candidate)
than their most preferred one if she thus expects to be more likely to influence the outcome
of this election than by casting a sincere vote. Two-ballot systems provide ample
opportunity for voters to split their ticket between candidate and list vote in an election for
the same level of governance. Voters are said to cast a straight ticket if they cast their
candidate vote for the local candidate of the same party they cast their list vote for. Thus,
the party of the candidate and party list they vote for are one and the same. Otherwise,
they cast a split ticket.
Ordinarily, systems with a PR tier have more than just two parties in parliament,
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and before an election it is not fully obvious to voters whether one party will get enough
votes to form a single-party majority. In order to best influence the outcome of an election
in mixed electoral systems strategic voters have to deal with the fundamental question,
which party will have a chance to gain a majority of the seats to form a government? They
have to consider several viable coalitions of parties and split their ticket in a particular way
to support their most preferred coalition if the party they otherwise like most is not
expected to gain a majority of seats in parliament. This rational is quite different from the
typical micro logic presented in the literature about strategic voting in single-member
plurality systems where the focus is merely on the success of the most preferred party.
Although parties are important in systems with a PR tier, and after all, voters still cast
their votes for parties and not for coalitions, voters are used to think about possible
coalitions of parties as prospective governments (Austen-Smith and Banks 1988; Laver and
Schofield 1990; Pappi and Eckstein 1998).
In order to behave strategically in mixed electoral systems voters have to anticipate
the government formation process and form expectations about the success of parties and
coalitions. Expectations about the viability of certain candidates, parties, or coalitions
come into play when voters make a decision whether to desert their most preferred choice
and for whom to vote instead. Thus, voters are no mere servants of their preferences, as
traditional models of voting behavior would have us believe. Quite to the contrary, as in
Goldoni’s famous play, voters are “servants of two masters”: their preferences and their
expectations.
There are two main processes by which voters derive expectations. First, attentive
voters follow the discussions about coalition options, along with pre-election polls during
the campaign. It seems clear, however, that this process can only have an impact on the
decision calculus of attentive, and therefore political aware and informed, voters. Since
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voters do not face a tabula rasa situation in the voting booth, there is surely a second
process at play, through which even voters who do not follow the campaign closely can be
seen to form expectations. As “cognitive misers” (Fiske and Taylor 1991), individuals
frequently employ heuristics to simplify their decision-making processes. They are likely to
adopt what I call the electoral history heuristic. Voters look back to previous elections.
Even if they cannot recall the correct result of these elections, they can easily form beliefs
at least about the rough coordinates of the competitive electoral landscape. Inferences
based on these beliefs need not to be particular accurate. It is sufficient that voters have an
idea about who the strong contenders are or which coalitions are typically formed. Both of
these processes help voters to cope with the uncertainty surrounding an election outcome
and generate their expectations about the success of parties and coalitions. Voters create
new expectations or simply update their prior beliefs about the outcome of an election in
Bayesian fashion.1
Two Facets of Strategic Voting
Strategic votes have a predictable pattern. Given their expectations strategic voters
most likely split their ticket in a particular way to enhance the likelihood of getting their
most preferred coalition into government. Although some voters might prefer a three-party
coalition, there is no way that, with only two votes, voters could systematically enhance
the likelihood of such a coalition. Thus, given that coalitions are (almost) unavoidable,
only two-party coalitions can be relevant for the decision-making process of strategic
voters. Moreover, a coalition of two small parties is not relevant if these parties together
are not able to gain a majority of seats in parliament. A coalition between two major
parties is, however, always a theoretical option. It is up to the respective party elites
whether such a coalition is formed. Major parties rather try to form “minimum winning
coalitions” (Riker 1962) instead.
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Nevertheless, there is no reasonable strategy for supporters of a coalition between
two major parties to best influence the outcome of the election. Neither casting a straight
ticket for either of the parties nor splitting the ticket between these parties will enhance
the chances to get such a coalition into government. In mixed electoral systems with a
two-ballot system only two-party coalitions between a major and a small party can
motivate voters to split their ticket strategically. What kind of strategies do voters employ?
In the plurality tier, the mechanism behind strategic voting is the well-known
Duvergerian logic to avoid wasting a vote on an uncompetitive candidate (Cox 1997;
Duverger 1954; Shively 1970). Figure 1 summarizes this strategic ticket splitting pattern as
a result of a strategic candidate vote.
[Figure 1 about here]
Strategic candidate voters are supporters of a small party. Because of the plurality
rule used to transform candidate votes into seats, they expect that “their” local party
representative has no chance of winning the district race. Thus, avoiding to waste their
candidate vote these voters strategically split their ticket most effectively the following
way: They cast a strategic candidate vote for the most viable major party representative of
their preferred coalition and a sincere list vote for their party.2
Small-party supporters only cast a strategic vote for a candidate of a less preferred
party if the expected utility from having this candidate elected to parliament is higher than
the expected utility if the candidate of their most preferred party is elected. Particularly in
close races, small-party supporters should be more inclined to avoid wasting their candidate
votes because they more likely expect to make a difference in competitive rather than in a
non-competitive district races. Hence, the expected utility for small-party supporters to
actually cast a strategic candidate vote depends on the closeness of the district race. Thus,
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small-party supporters should be more inclined to cast a strategic candidate vote the closer
the district race is expected. Thus my first hypothesis is as follows.
Hypothesis 1 (Wasted Vote) The closer the district race, the more likely are small-party
supporters to follow the wasted-vote strategy and cast a strategic candidate vote.
The PR tier of a mixed-electoral system, however, offers another rationale for voting
strategically. Contrary to the plurality tier, strategic list voters in the PR tier can be found
among supporters of major parties. If their most preferred coalition has a junior partner
who is in danger of falling below the national threshold of representation, they might be
motivated to employ a coalition insurance strategy. As can be seen in figure 1 these voters
strategically split their ticket the following way: They cast a sincere candidate vote for the
party representative of their preferred party and a strategic list vote for the junior coalition
partner of their most preferred viable coalition to ensure that it will overcome the
threshold and, thus, that their most preferred party is leading the coalition. If the junior
partner fails to overcome that threshold, the senior partner alone might not play a leading
role in the prospective government.
What are the mechanics behind a coalition insurance strategy in the PR tier?
List-vote shares are aggregated at the national level. The competitiveness of the district
race should therefore have no influence on voters employing the coalition insurance
strategy on the list vote. Major-party supporters only cast a strategic list vote if the
expected utility of ensuring representation of the smaller coalition partner is higher than
from simply casting a straight ticket for their most preferred party. The expected utility of
casting a list vote to support the junior coalition partner could be in fact higher if it
increases the chances to get one’s most preferred viable coalition into government.
If major-party supporters expect that the smaller coalition partner will not be
represented in parliament they would rather cast a sincere straight ticket. Likewise, if
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major-party supporters are absolutely certain that the smaller coalition partner will
overcome the national threshold the incentive to cast a strategic list vote should also
rapidly disappear. These voters are likely to cast a straight ticket as well. A strategic list
vote is most likely if major-party supporters are unsure whether the small coalition partner
can overcome the threshold of representation. Thus, in general, the expected utility to cast
a strategic list vote should be curvilinear and highest if voters expect to be pivotal, that is
if they expect that their vote is essential for the small coalition partner to garner just
enough list votes to make it above the threshold. The incentives to follow the coalition
insurance strategy are lowest either if voters are certain that the small party will make it or
if voters are certain that the small party will not make it above the threshold of
representation. Especially campaigns of the smaller coalition partners allude to the options
of casting a strategic list vote (Roberts 1988). Although this logic is acknowledged in the
literature (e.g., Blais and Massicotte 1996; Cox 1997; Pappi and Thurner 2002) scholars so
far failed to provide more than anecdotal evidence that major-party supporters
systematically desert their party on the list vote in favor of the respective small coalition
partner. This seems quite puzzling.
I offer a solution to that puzzle, though. Following the coalition insurance strategy
and casting a strategic list vote implies for major-party supporters that they have to desert
their party on the list vote. This desertion is costly because it effectively reduces the seat
share of their most preferred party in parliament. These costs presumably vary across
voters. Take, for instance, a major-party supporter who much more prefers one party over
all other parties. I expect such a voter to be less likely to desert their party no matter how
strong the strategic incentive in a particular situation might be. Independently of all
strategic considerations such voters have already a low tendency to desert their most
preferred party. Now, take a major-party supporter, who prefers the junior coalition
partner only slightly less. Again, independently of what particular expectations this voter
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has formed about the likelihood that the junior coalition partner is able to overcome the
threshold of representation, a desertion of her most preferred party is a priori less costly.
Thus, I expect the logic of the coalition insurance strategy to be more pervasive, if three
conditions hold. First, the voter must most prefer a major party. Second, he or she has to
be uncertain whether their respective small coalition partner will be represented in
parliament. Third, the voter need to have a high enough tendency to desert his or her most
preferred party. Hence, the second hypothesis is as follows:
Hypothesis 2 (Coalition Insurance) If major-party supporters are unsure about the
expectations whether or not the smaller coalition partner will be represented in parliament
and the higher their tendency to desert their most preferred party, the more likely they are
to follow the coalition insurance strategy and cast a strategic list vote.
The first two hypotheses deal with the influence of electoral rules on how voters
behave at the polls. Although electoral institutions provide incentives to vote strategically,
these incentives vary in their impact on voters’ decision-making process. I propose that a
voter’s proclivity to vote strategically determines the degree to which these incentives are
systematically anticipated in her decision calculus.
The Proclivity of Strategic Voting
Typically the literature lumps together all ticket-splitters into one group (Burden
and Kimball 1998; Fiorina 1992). Scholars often focus solely on the attitudinal and
demographic differences between ticket-splitters and straight-ticket voters (Beck et al. 1992;
Campbell and Miller 1957). This is certainly an oversimplification of the ticket-splitting
phenomenon. There might be a variety of reasons why voters split their tickets (Pappi and
Thurner 2002, 210-211). I do not expect ticket-splitters to be a homogeneous group.
Instead, my goal is to disentangle this category into two constituent groups: strategic
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ticket-splitters employing one of two strategies, and all other remaining ticket-splitters.
Voting behavior, as every type of behavior, is not only situational but also
dispositional determined. The prerequisites for strategic voting are that a voter
understands the strategic rationales and that she is able and motivated to employ them.
Given these constraints, voters should vary widely in their proclivity to vote strategically.
This proclivity depends on at least two factors: the motivation to cast a strategic vote and
the capability to understand the strategic implications of the electoral rules when it comes
down to cast a vote for one party or another. Surprisingly, all studies about strategic
voting are built on a rather different and unrealistic understanding of the strategic homo
politicus. The underlying assumption in this literature is that, given certain institutional
constraints, all voters seem to have the same proclivity to act strategically.
If voters vary in their proclivity to act strategically, some should posses a higher
intrinsic motivation to engage in an effortful decision calculus than others. Since splitting a
ticket requires presumably a higher elaboration than to simply casting a straight ticket
(Gschwend 2004), I expect such voters to have a higher proclivity to cast a strategic vote.
From the political behavior literature, we know more about the motivational differences
that anchor voters. The standard finding is that voters who split their ticket have weaker
partisan attachments than straight-ticket voters (Beck et al. 1992; Karp et al. 2002; Nie
et al. 1976, e.g.). Thus, the third hypothesis is as follows.
Hypothesis 3 (Motivation) The weaker voters’ partisanship, the stronger they are
motivated to split their ticket.
Besides motivation, the remaining factor that determines voters’ proclivity to vote
strategically is their capability to understand the implications of their choices. Voters with
high levels of political sophistication are capable to comprehend various options that the
electoral rules offer them (Duch and Palmer 2002; Zaller 1992). Thus, my fourth
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hypothesis is as follows.
Hypothesis 4 (Capability) The higher voters’ level of political sophistication, the more
likely they are to cast a strategic vote.
To sum up, I developed two sets of hypotheses. The first set of hypotheses
introduces two different strategies and lays out the conditions under which voters might
follow them. My general argument is that there is more to strategic voting than simply
avoiding to waste one’s vote. Contrary to the findings about voting behavior in plurality
systems the coalition insurance hypothesis implies that in electoral systems with a PR tier
even small parties might be the beneficiaries of strategic voting. The second set of
hypotheses lays out two further individual characteristics that define a voter’s proclivity to
vote strategically. My general argument here is that incentives provided by electoral
institutions vary in their impact on voters’ decision-making process. Contrary to the
“common wisdom” in the strategic voting literature voters respond differently to same
institutional incentives.
Case Selection: The German Context
In order to test these hypotheses, a mixed electoral system with two ballots offers
the opportunity to study the impact of electoral rules while controlling for various personal
factors. Focussing on one election in one country also has an advantage over pooling data
from various elections or electoral systems because the potential influence of intervening
variables such as social cleavages, political culture, generalized issue dimensions and the
party system can be largely controlled given that the elections were held at the same time
in the same country. Because of its 50-year tradition of applying mixed electoral rules in
national elections, I expect that the German electorate has gained sufficient experience
with this rather complicated electoral system. Thus, one would expect that whatever
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strategies voters can use in such systems, they are likely to be crystallized - and observable
- within the voting patterns of recent German elections. Since the kind of hypothesized
strategies, however, pertains to the ballot structure of mixed systems, the findings are
likely to be comparable across a wide range of mixed electoral systems.
The electoral rules in Germany include a single-member district tier, where only the
candidate who garners a plurality of the candidate votes wins. The PR tier offers even
small party lists a chance to gain representation in parliament if they get more than five
percent of all list votes nationally. List votes are aggregated on the national level and
determine the party seat shares in parliament. Given the German electoral rules, a
strategic candidate vote of a small-party supporter who follows the wasted-vote strategy is
essentially costless since it does not harm the small party’s overall seat share in parliament
(Pappi and Thurner 2002, 213)3. The current party system in Germany consists of two
large parties, the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) and the Christian
Democratic Union (CDU)/Christian Social Union (CSU)4, each getting about 40% of the
list votes, and three small parties - the Free Democratic Party (FDP), the Party of
Democratic Socialism (PDS) and the Greens - each garnering just over 5% of the list votes.
CDU and FDP were the “incumbent coalition” before the 1998 election for sixteen years.
The parliamentary opposition that tried to challenge the CDU/FDP coalition was
comprised of the SPD and the Greens. These coalitions of a major party - CDU and SPD,
respectively - and a small party - FDP and the Greens, respectively - were considered
viable before the election.5 Therefore, following the the logic described in figure 1, FDP or
Green supporters acting strategically are expected to cast strategic candidate votes, while
CDU and SPD supporters acting strategically are expected to cast strategic list votes.
Data, Analysis and Results
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There are many possibilities of how voters split their tickets. The 1998 German NES
pre-election study on which this analysis is based was conducted in the last four weeks
prior to the election and has two vote-intention items for candidate and list vote,
respectively.6 Because I am interested in explaining why some voters cast a strategic vote
as opposed to a straight ticket, or whether they split their tickets in a non-strategic
fashion, my dependent variable has three categories: (1) respondents casting a straight
ticket; (2) those who split their ticket strategically, i.e. those who intend to cast a
candidate vote for the CDU and a list vote for the FDP or a candidate vote for the SPD
and a list vote for the Greens, respectively; and (3) those who split their ticket any other
(non-strategic) way7. There might be factors that cause a type of voting behavior that is
observationally equivalent to a strategic split-ticket pattern but actually is neither caused
by a wasted-vote nor a coalition insurance strategy. These factors are likely to be
idiosyncratic and are, therefore, uncorrelated with the factors that are expected to tap
preferences and expectations that predict a strategic vote.8
Since the categories of the dependent variable are unordered I will estimate a
multinomial logit model (MNL) to test my hypotheses simultaneously.9 The Wasted Vote
Hypothesis addresses the strategy at play for the candidate vote. If small-party supporter
expect a competitive race they should be more likely to cast a strategic candidate vote.
This implies a hypothesized interaction effect of being a small-party supporter and the
competitiveness of the district race. I include a dummy for small-party supporters scoring
one if voters identify with either the FDP or the Greens. The competitiveness of the
district is usually measured by the (candidate) vote margin between the top two contenders
(Black 1978, 1980; Cain 1978). It is reasonable to assume a nonlinear relationship between
the district margin and the likelihood to vote strategically because an additional increase of
an already expected large margin should provide less extra incentives for small-party
supporters to avoid wasting their candidate vote than in highly competitive races.10 My
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prediction is that the more competitive the district race is expected - that is, the smaller
the squared root of the district margin - the higher will be the incentive for voters to avoid
wasting their candidate vote on an uncompetitive candidate. Thus, the coefficient of this
interaction should be negative for the choice between casting an strategic vote as opposed
to a straight ticket.
In order to test the Coalition Insurance Hypothesis and to provide more than
anecdotal evidence for this strategy on the list vote I will construct two three-way
interactions in the following way. One has to assess the influence of voters’ expectations
about the success of the small coalition partner, either the FDP or the Greens, for
supporters of the respective major coalition partner, depending on the costs they have to
bear deserting their most preferred party at the polls. In the pre-election study of the 1998
German NES respondents were asked about their subjective expectations whether the FDP
or the Greens would get 5% of the list votes. The answer categories run from “absolutely
certain that the party will exceed” the national threshold of 5% to “absolutely certain that
the party will not”. Two middle categories are comprised of respondents who are neither
completely certain nor completely uncertain. Since the likelihood of a strategic list vote
should be highest if voters are unsure whether the small coalition partner can overcome the
national threshold, the likelihood to cast a strategic list vote should be curvilinear and
highest if voters are at the theoretical middle position between both extremes. I therefore
construct separate dummy variables for expectations about the success of the FDP and the
Greens to overcome the 5% threshold by collapsing both middle categories. Thus both
expectation dummies score one if respondents are neither completely certain nor
completely uncertain that the party will make it and zero otherwise. The expectations
about the FDP should only be relevant for CDU supporters, i.e. for those who identify
themselves with the CDU, and, likewise, expectations about the success of the Greens
should only make a difference for those who identify with the SPD.
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The Coalition Insurance Hypothesis also points out that for a CDU (or SPD)
supporter, the influence of their expectation that the FDP (the Greens) will overcome the
threshold should be moderated by the costs they have to bear casting such a strategic vote.
I will measure these costs by the absolute difference between the two most preferred parties
on the likes/dislikes-scale. In general, the smaller this difference the easier it is to desert
someone’s most preferred party on the list vote. I will transform this difference in the
following way to ease interpretation of both three-way interactions. The ratio
1
absolute difference+1
defines a desertion score. Higher scores indicate a stronger tendency to
desert someone’s most preferred party. Suppose respondents whose two most preferred
parties are tied. The absolute difference between the two most preferred parties is at its
minimum (= 0), and hence the desertion score is at its maximum (= 1). Now suppose
respondents whose two most preferred parties score at 10 and 0, respectively, on the party
likes/dislikes-scale. The respective tendency to desert their most preferred party will be 1
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.
Such respondents clearly have a lower tendency to desert their most preferred party - no
matter their expectations about the success of the FDP and the Greens to gain
representation. Even in the most favorable case, where, say, a CDU supporter is unsure
wether the FDP is able to overcome the national threshold, if she has a low desertion score
one hardly expects her to follow the coalition insurance strategy. Strategic voting is simply
too costly for this voter. All composite terms are coded such that higher scores indicate a
higher likelihood of casting a strategic list vote.
To sum up, respondents with high values on all three composite terms fit the causal
process laid out in figure 1 by the coalition insurance strategy and, hence, are predicted to
cast a strategic list vote as opposed to respondents that score low on one of these terms.
Note that respondents may get a product score of zero if they do not identify with one of
the major parties or if they are either completely certain that the party will make it or
completely certain that the party will not make it. Thus, I expect a positive coefficient for
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both three-way interactions for the choice between casting a strategic vote as opposed to a
straight ticket.
Furthermore I developed a Motivation Hypothesis. If voters are strong partisans
they might be less motivated to split their ticket. Such voters presumably have a lower
proclivity to think, and finally to vote strategically. As in American NES surveys,
respondents of the German NES have to rate the strength of their partisan attachment as
weak (= 1), moderate (= 2), or strong (= 3). Respondents without any partisan
identification or people who refuse to report it are recoded as 0. Finally, I recode every
score to range from 0 to 1 in order to facilitate comparison of the estimated coefficients.
My expectation is that the stronger voters’ partisanship the more motivated they will be to
cast a sincere straight ticket for their most preferred party. Thus, I expect a negative
coefficient in the first set of estimates.
Finally, the proclivity to vote strategically depends also on a voter’s capability to
comprehend various options that the electoral rules offer her. I expect that the level of a
respondent’s political sophistication should reflect a voter’s capability to use these rules
most effectively. I prefer factual knowledge questions about politics in order to construct a
political sophistication scale. Like Zaller (1992), I rely on the ability to locate the main
political parties “correctly” on a left-right scale. In order to get a score of 1 for a “correct”
answer, respondents must place parties on the left-right scale in a meaningful way.
Placements are only assessed relative to one another, for instance, whether one party is
located to the right of another party. Respondents who either get a location test item
wrong, as well as those who have missing values because they did not place a particular
party, score a 0 on this item.11 All nine scores are summed, then divided by the total
number of items. Thus my sophistication scale also ranges from 0 to 1. I expect that
political sophistication should facilitate strategic considerations, and hence strategic
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voting. The coefficients for the probability of casting a strategic vote versus the baseline of
casting a straight ticket, should be positive.
In addition I also include a control variable - a “West” dummy - to account for the
fact that the logic of strategic voting operates on different levels in the two regions of the
country, since the nature of the party system and the experience with it is different in East
and West Germany. Table 1 presents the estimation results of this three-choice model.
[Table 1 about here]
Overall, the model fit is pretty good. This model classifies about four-fifth of all
respondents correctly12. Assessing all hypotheses simultaneously requires tests of particular
two- and three-way interactions. In order to do that one has to include many lower-order
coefficients in the model despite interpreting them individually (Braumoeller 2004). All
interesting coefficients are set in bold. The estimation results provide strong evidence for
the wasted-vote hypothesis. Small-party supporters are more likely to split their ticket
strategically and cast a strategic candidate vote for the candidate of their major party
coalition partner, the more competitive the district race is expected to be. To ease the
interpretation of this two-way interaction, figure 2 presents predicted probabilities, along
with their 95% confidence intervals, of a small-party supporter casting a strategic
(candidate) vote in the Western part of the country. All other variables are set to their
mean.
[Figure 2 about here]
As hypothesized the influence of the expected competitiveness of the district race is
strongest in close races. The probability of an otherwise average small-party supporter to
cast a strategic candidate vote more than doubles in districts where the top two contenders
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are expected to be very close as opposed to a district with a large district margin. In fact
the estimated effect is large enough that two otherwise average small-party supporters are
predicted to behave differently depending only on the expected competitiveness of the
district they live in. The model predicts them to cast an strategic candidate vote in a very
competitive district race (i.e., with a district margin of less than 2 %-points) as opposed to
a straight-ticket otherwise. Thus, the expected closeness of the district race does matter
substantively to the decision calculus of small-party supporters.
Going back to the MNL estimation results in table 1, the Coalition Insurance
Hypothesis predicts a positive sign for the coefficient of both three-way-interactions. There
is strong evidence that CDU supporters casting a strategic list vote in support of the FDP
- their junior coalition partner. Casting such a strategic vote instead of a straight ticket is
all the more likely the lower the costs, i.e., the higher one’s desertion score is, given that
CDU supporters are unsure whether the FDP will gain seats in parliament.
[Figure 3 about here]
Figure 3 represents the predicted probabilities along with their 95 % confidence
intervals of a strategic vote for supporters of the CDU who have their party and the junior
coalition partner, the FDP, tied on first preference. Apparently, the expectation whether
the small coalition partner will be represented in parliament makes a difference for voters
who do not bear high costs from deserting their most preferred party that are associated
with the coalition insurance strategy. Including the costs of strategic voting is warranted in
order to provide more than anecdotal evidence that major-party supporters strategically
desert their party on the list vote. If these costs rise, however, the impact of expectations
on a voter’s decision-making process drops rather quickly. Nevertheless, the coalition
insurance strategy shows that there are reasons to strategically desert large parties. This
provides stark contrast to the conventual wisdom that strategic voting always reduces the
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fragmentation of party systems. This is not the case. Interestingly, there is only evidence
of strategic voting in favor of the FDP. Both parties, CDU and FDP, have been the
incumbent government of this election. It appears that the pre-electoral identifiability
(Powell 2000) of incumbent coalitions is higher than for other prospective coalitions in the
opposition, such as between SPD and the Greens, and, thus, might facilitate strategic
coordination of their supporters.
Do people vary in their proclivity to vote strategically even when facing the same
incentives? In support of the Motivation Hypothesis the respective coefficient in the first
set of estimates is negative and highly significant indicating that strong partisans are
indeed about 5 times (= 1/exp(−1.616)) more likely than non-partisans to cast a straight
ticket rather than to split their ticket non-strategically. Finally, the Capability Hypothesis
is also supported by the data. Political sophisticates are about 1.7 times (= exp(0.522))
more likely than political novices to react strategically to the incentives that are provided
by the electoral system rather than casting a straight ticket.
To sum up, there is more to strategic voting than simply avoiding to waste
someone’s vote if one liberates oneself from the corset of studying voting behavior in
plurality systems. Mixed electoral systems do provide different voters with various
incentives to cast a strategic vote. Moreover, some voters are more likely to cast a strategic
vote than others even when they are facing the same incentives. The evidence of
Motivation and Capability Hypothesis make transparent that an individual’s proclivity to
vote strategically systematically varies across voters.
Conclusion
Mixed electoral systems provide an ideal institutional context to generate and test
theories about the influence of electoral rules on the way people make decisions in the
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voting booth. This paper provides several contributions to the literature on strategic
voting, ticket-splitting, and on electoral systems. Employing a “within-subject design”
offers the possibility to provide different incentives to cast a strategic vote that operate at
the same time for the same voter. This notion hinges on the assumption that voters form
independent decisions in every tier. Some doubts are in order. For instance, in various
electoral systems the name of a candidate is accompanied with the respective party label
on the ballot. This makes personal votes a priori less likely. Moreover, explicitly labelling
candidates as party representatives might reflect that national party politics not only
influences voters decision-making process in the PR tier but also in the plurality tier. The
nature of nationalized election campaigns and the importance of coalition governments
further undermines the independence assumption similarly. The presence of these
contamination effects (Ferrara and Herron 2005; Gschwend et al. 2003; Herron and
Nishikawa 2001) might therefore lead scholars to underestimate the degree of strategic
voting that has had occurred if both tiers were independent.13 It is thus all the harder to
find systematic evidence of strategic voting. Nevertheless, a potential limitation of this
study is that the pre-electoral identifiability of prospective coalitions of parties does not
vary systematically. So far it is unclear whether this affects the generalizability of the
present findings. Further research on the impact of party system characteristics is
necessary in order to predict the winners and losers from strategic coordination.
The results of this study indicate, as hypothesized, that particular institutions not
only determine the degree of strategic voting, but also the kind of strategies voters
systematically employ to make their decision. Despite theoretically important, the latter is
something the literature has up to now not systematically examined. Strategic voting has
two facets in mixed electoral systems. In the plurality tier, strategic small-party supporters
employ the wasted-vote strategy and cast an strategic candidate vote for a major party
candidate. The PR tier, however, offers another rationale for voting strategically. Strategic
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major-party supporters employ a coalition insurance strategy and cast strategic list vote for
the junior partner of their most preferred coalition. Following either of these strategies
results in observationally equivalent split-ticket patterns: A candidate vote for a major
party candidate of a viable coalition and a list vote for the junior coalition partner’s party
list. Thus, contrary to previous research, strategic votes have a predictable direction. Not
only does one predict who is likely to be deserted but also who gets favored by strategic
voting.
Moreover, the implications of strategic voting for the transformation- and
consolidation process, particularly for newly established democracies, are more pronounced
as the current literature (Duch and Palmer 2002) implies. Strategic voting does not
automatically facilitate the development of a stable party system because not all strategies
favor large parties at the disadvantage of marginal parties. The implications of the
coalition insurance strategy is that small parties can also be the beneficiaries of strategic
voting. Such behavior will facilitate the fragmentation and destabilization of a party
system - something that might be less desirable in newly established democracies.
Finally, this study provides evidence that people vary in their proclivity to vote
strategically. These findings directly refute the unrealistic assumption in the literature
about the strategic homo politicus whereby given the same incentives all voters should have
the same proclivity to act strategically. These results should also inform the ticket-splitting
literature. Ticket splitters act not necessarily strategic, but some of them do. In contrast
to the conventional wisdom, this analysis reveals that ticket-splitters differ on several
characteristics. They should not simply be collapsed into a single residual category as it is
typically done. Instead, scholars should disentangle this residual category of voters in order
to extract more information from it. An obvious direction for future research is to provide
empirical evidence for the distinction of non-strategic ticket splitters and strategic ticket
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splitters across several institutional settings. The proclivity to vote strategically does not
depend on particular electoral rules. If various strategies are identifiable, tests of the
Motivation as well as the Capability Hypothesis can be easily obtained for voters in other
electoral settings.
21
Notes
1Formal theorists employ a similar argument to make plausible the assumption that
voters form “rational expectations” (Cox 1997; Cox and Shugart 1996; Fey 1997). There is
also experimental evidence that the electoral history heuristic facilitates generating
consistent expectations (Forsythe et al. 1993).
2Personal votes (Cain et al. 1987) are an alternative explanation given that they are not
mere rationalizations of partisan preferences. This requires voters to be able to rank
candidates independently of their party preferences. Nevertheless, the mechanism behind
this ability is not likely to be correlated with the expectation of the closeness of the district
race.
3While the micro logic of strategic voting applies equally well to other mixed-electoral
systems, this logic seems to suggest that a strategic candidate vote becomes more costly
the stronger the seat linkage between plurality and PR tiers is.
4I consider the CDU/CSU party cartel as inseparable. In fact, they do not compete in
the same districts. The CSU runs candidates only in Bavaria and the CDU everywhere
else. For simplicity, I use the CDU notation as a shorthand for this party alliance.
5The Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), the successor party of the communists in
the former GDR, is practically non-existent in West Germany but very strong in East
Germany. The East German party system is still in flux. There are no established coalition
patterns involving the PDS as of yet.
6The 1998 German NES (ZA-No. 3066) can be obtained from the Central Archive for
Empirical Social Research, Germany. N = 1633. 540 observations were dropped from the
analysis mostly because respondents had not reported any candidate and list vote.
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7The distribution of the dependent variable is as follows: 82% straight ticket voters, 6%
strategic voters and 12% non-strategic ticket-splitters.
8For instance, small-party supporters might prefer the candidate of major coalition
partner to the candidate of their own party. Thus their voting patterns appear strategically
although they split their ticket sincerely. There might be also voters who habitually split
their ticket as if they act strategically without trading preferences for expectations, i.e.
they do not react strategically to the incentives provided by the institutional setting and
the nature of the party system.
9A MNL model yields only consistent estimates if the independence of irrelevant
alternatives (IIA) assumption holds in the data. Since the probability of casting a straight
ticket should theoretically be unchanged if one of the other categories is removed, the IIA
assumption should not be violated. Several Hausman tests support this conjecture.
10Moreover, taking the square root of the actual margin also stabilizes the variances and
makes the distribution of these values approximately symmetrical. Some scholars prefer
clearly exogenous measures for voter expectations and employ district results of the
previous election. Presumably, this is readily available for voters. Other scholars prefer to
employ results of the current election. The disadvantage is obvious: How could a voter
know the outcome before the election? In response, supporters of using current-election
data retort that using results from the very same election better approximates pre-election
polls in that district than results from the previous election, which usually do not exist in
mixed electoral systems. Data from earlier elections might not represent the current
situation at all. The closeness of the race or the personality of the candidates might be
different today than in prior elections. Using current results has the added advantage that
it does not assume that people stayed in the same district since the previous election.
11The “correct” answers of the 9 “location tests” on a 1 (left) - 11 (right) scale are as
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follows: CDU to the right of the Greens, DVU to the right of SPD, Republicans to the
right of the midpoint (= 6), PDS to the left of DVU, FDP not at the extremes (placed
neither 1, 2, 3 nor 9, 10, 11), CDU to the right of SPD, SPD to the right of PDS, FDP to
the left of Republicans, and CDU to the left of Republicans. The answers conform to a
standard spatial representation of political parties in Germany. These nine comparative
placement items have an average inter-item correlation of .33 and the additive
sophistication scale has an alpha reliability of .78.
12All estimates are accompanied with robust White-Huber standard errors clustered for
respondents from the same electoral district to account for the fact that respondents in the
same electoral district react not independently to the incentives provided by the electoral
rules.
13One likely consequence of these contamination effects is that more straight-ticket
voting is observed (Cox and Schoppa 2002) as otherwise expected. Furthermore, there
might be voters who split their tickets “seemingly strategically” among both parties of their
preferred coalition. Such a vote is not strategic if voters do not form expectations about the
outcome and vote accordingly in order to influence it. Thus, it is necessary for explaining
strategic voting to include voters’ expectations about the outcome into our models.
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Predisposition Hypothesized Voting Pattern Actual Voting Pattern 
Party Supporter Electoral Calculus Candidate
Vote
List
Vote
Candidate
Vote
List
Vote
Sincere Straight Ticket ____ sincere sincere
Major
Party
Major
Party
Major Party
Supporter
Strategic Split Ticket 
“Coalition Insurance” Strategy
____ sincere strategic
Major
Party
Small
Party
Strategic Split Ticket 
“Wasted-Vote” Strategy 
____ strategic sincere
Small Party
Supporter
Sincere Straight Ticket ____ sincere sincere
Small
Party
Small
Party
Figure 1: Strategic and Sincere Voting Pattern
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Ticket-Splitting vs. Strategic Vote vs.
Straight-Ticket Straight-Ticket
Independent Variables Coeff. Std.Err. P>z Coeff. Std.Err. P>z
Competitiveness -0.161 0.090 0.075 0.188 0.125 0.134
PID small party 2.032 0.977 0.037 4.464 0.887 0.000
PID small party x Competitiveness -0.363 0.292 0.214 -0.575 0.186 0.002
Cost of strategic voting 0.872 1.272 0.493 -0.075 1.291 0.954
PID CDU -1.183 1.204 0.326 0.437 1.411 0.757
Expectation FDP -1.141 0.673 0.090 -1.192 0.804 0.138
PID CDU x Expectation FDP 1.986 1.261 0.115 -1.158 1.528 0.449
PID CDU x Cost of strategic voting 3.272 1.947 0.093 -2.634 1.510 0.081
Cost of strategic voting  x Expectation FDP 1.915 1.189 0.107 0.991 1.240 0.424
PID CDU x Cost of strategic voting  x Expectation FDP -3.738 2.143 0.081 5.133 1.771 0.004
PID SPD -1.626 1.355 0.230 -1.900 1.919 0.322
Expectation Green 0.182 0.571 0.750 -0.095 0.698 0.891
PID SPD x Expectation Green 2.067 1.375 0.133 1.322 1.917 0.490
PID SPD x Cost of strategic voting 1.919 1.603 0.231 3.530 2.041 0.084
Cost of strategic voting  x Expectation Green -0.964 0.881 0.274 0.406 1.115 0.716
PID SPD x Cost of strategic voting  x Expectation Green -1.943 1.771 0.273 -1.563 2.398 0.514
Strength of Partisanship -1.616 0.494 0.001 -1.008 0.790 0.202
Political Sophistication -0.094 0.185 0.612 0.522 0.254 0.040
West -0.435 0.241 0.070 1.057 0.544 0.052
Constant -0.856 0.771 0.266 -3.940 1.028 0.000
N 1095
Percent Correctly Classified 82.1%
Table 1: Disentangling Straight-Ticket from Strategic and Non-Strategic Ticket-Splitting.
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Figure 2: Simulated Impact of District Competitiveness on the Probability to cast a Strate-
gic Candidate Vote. The horizontal axis indicates the competitiveness of the district race.
The shaded region represent the 95% confidence intervals around the simulated predicted
probabilities.
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Figure 3: Simulated Impact of Expectations on the Probability to cast a Strategic List Vote.
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